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Abstract
In this paper, a new algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem
is presented which is similar to the usual baby-step giant-step algorithm.
Our algorithm exploits the order of the discrete logarithm in the multiplica-
tive group of a finite field. Using randomization with parallelized collision
search, our algorithm indicates some weakness in NIST curves over prime
fields which are considered to be the most conservative and safest curves
among all NIST curves.
Keywords: Discrete logarithm problem, baby-step giant-step algorithm, NIST
curves over prime fields, parallelized collision search.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that computationally hard number theoretic problems are used as
primitives in public-key cryptography. On that basis, public-key cryptography can
be divided into two categories. One uses the hardness of factorizing large integer as
the building blocks to construct public-key protocols and the other is based on the
computational difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem. In this paper,
we are interested in the latter.
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and generated by P which is written
additive. Given an element Q = xP ∈ G, the discrete logarithm problem(DLP)
in G is to compute the integer x. This integer x is called the discrete logarithm of
Q with the base P . There are generic algorithms such as the baby-step giant-step
algorithm [3] which solves DLP in any group G.
In this paper, we develop and study a different version of the baby-step giant-
step algorithm. The novelty of our approach comes from the implicit representation
using F×p as auxiliary group. Our approach leads to a way to reduce the discrete
logarithm problem to a problem in F×p . The advantage of this approach is, F×p
has many subgroups and one can exploit the rich and well understood subgroup
structure of F×p .
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In Theorem 1 we develop an algorithm that solves the discrete logarithm prob-
lem using implicit representation. Two things come out of this theorem:
A If the secret key x belongs to some small subgroup of F×p , there can be an
efficient attack on the DLP.
B If somehow it is known to an attacker that the secret key is in some subgroup H
of F×p , that information can be used to develop a better attack.
The question remains, what happens if no information about the secret x is
known. We develop a probabilistic algorithm (Theorem 2) to expand our attack.
To understand this probabilistic attack properly, we study it on the curve P-256.
This is an NIST recommended curve over a prime field and is considered secure.
Our study, which we present in details in Section 3 indicates some weakness in this
curve.
2 Main Work
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and generated by P which is written ad-
ditive. For y ∈ Fp, yP ∈ G is called the implicit representation of y ∈ Fp(with
respect to G and P ). The following lemma comes from the idea of implicit repre-
sentation of a finite field, proposed by Maurer and Wolf [5].
Lemma 1. Let a, b be any two integers. Then a = b (mod p) if and only if aP =
bP in G.
Proof. Assume that a = b (mod p), then a = tp + b for some integer t. Then
aP = tpP + bP = bP . Conversely, assume that aP = bP , then (a− b)P = 0 in
G and this means p|(a− b) which implies that a = b (mod p).
The usefulness of this lemma is to be able to decide on the equality in F×p
by looking at the equality in G. The following algorithm to solve the discrete
logarithm problem uses the order of the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative
group of a finite field. This algorithm is different from the baby-step giant-step [3]
as it uses the implicit representation with multiplicative group of a finite field as
auxiliary group.
Theorem 1. Let G be an additive cyclic group generated by P and order of P is
a prime p. Let Q = xP be another given element of G(x is unknown). For a given
divisor d of p − 1, let H be the unique subgroup of F×p of order d. Then, one can
decide whether or not x belongs to H in O(
√
d) steps. Furthermore, if x belongs
to H , the same algorithm will also find the discrete logarithm x in O(√d) steps
where each step is an exponentiation in the group G.
Proof. Since H is a subgroup of the cyclic group F×p , we assume that it is generated
by some element ζ . If the generator of H is not given to us, we can compute it using
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a generator of F× and d. The proof of whether x belongs to H or not follows from
the well-known baby-step giant-step algorithm [3, Proposition 2.22] to compute
the discrete logarithm.
Let n be the smallest integer greater than
√
d. Then x ∈ H if and only if
there exists an integer k with 0 ≤ k ≤ d such that x = ζk (mod p). Note that
any integer k between 0 and d can be written as k = an − b for unique integers
a, b with 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n, by division algorithm. Therefore, x ∈ H if and only if
there exist two integers a, b with 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n such that x = ζan−b (mod p), or
equivalently ζbx = ζna (mod p). Using the lemma above, we see that x ∈ H if
and only if there exist two integers a, b with 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n such that ζbxP = ζnaP ,
equivalently ζbQ = (ζn)aP as Q = xP .
Now, we create a list
{
ζbQ : 0 ≤ b ≤ n}. Then we generate elements of the
form (ζn)aP for each integer a in [0, n] and try to find a collision with the earlier
list. When there is a collision, i.e., ζbQ = (ζn)aP for some 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n, it means
that x ∈ H . Otherwise, x /∈ H .
Moreover, if x ∈ H then ζbQ = (ζn)aP for some 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n. So, we use
the integers a and b to compute ζan−b (mod p) which is nothing but the discrete
logarithm x. Since the two lists require computation of at most 2n exponentiations,
the worst case time complexity of the algorithm to check whether or not x ∈ H , as
well as to compute x(if x ∈ H) would be O(n) ≈ O(
√
d) steps. This completes
the proof.
Remark 1. Even though the above algorithm is generic in nature, it does have
a practical significance. Our algorithm applies on all the five prime order NIST
curves [6] viz. P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521. Although the probability of
a randomly chosen secret key x being inside a particular subgroup of F×p can be
very small, however, it is advisable to check, using our algorithm for each curve, if
the secret key x belongs to any of two (large enough)subgroups whose orders are
mentioned in the appendix A. If it does, we discard the secret key.
Suppose that p−1 has large enough(but a lot smaller than p−1) divisor d and H
is the unique subgroup of F×p of order d. A drawback of the deterministic algorithm
given in Theorem 1 is that it might fail to solve DLP because the probability of x
belonging to H is very small. One way to increase the probability is to increase
the size of d, if such d exists. Clearly, this is not a desirable solution because the
computational cost depends on the size of the subgroup.
The above algorithm can be parallelized which helps us overcome this obstacle
by increasing the probability. We have randomized the above algorithm where the
random inputs will be running on parallel processes or threads. This paralleliza-
tion along with collision algorithm (based on birthday paradox) [3, Theorem 5.38]
yields a randomized probabilistic algorithm which can solve DLP with a given
probability.
Collision Theorem: An urn contains N balls, of which n balls are red and N − n
are blue. One randomly selects a ball from the urn, replaces it in the urn, randomly
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selects a second ball, replaces it, and so on. He does this until he has looked at a
total number of m balls. Then, the probability that he selects at least one red ball
is
Pr(at least one red ball) = 1−
(
1− n
N
)m
≥ 1− e−mnN .
Theorem 2. Let G be an additive cyclic group generated by P and the order of P
is a prime p. Let Q = xP be another given element of G(x is unknown). For a
given divisor d of p − 1, let H be the unique subgroup of F×p of order d. Then, x
can be computed in O(
√
d) steps with probability at least 1 − e
(
−dm
p−1
)
if one has
access to m parallel threads.
Proof. The main idea is to run the algorithm in Theorem 1 on each of m threads
as follows. We randomly selects m elements y1, y2, .., ym in F×p and compute
corresponding m elements Q1 = y1Q = (y1x)P ,...,Qm = ymQ = (ymx)P of
G. Now, we run the above algorithm on each of m parallel threads, with element
Qi = (yix)P running on ith thread. Let zi = yix (mod p) for i = 1, ..,m. If
zi ∈ H for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m; then the algorithm on that thread returns zi. Once
we have zi for some i, we compute zi · yi−1 (mod p) which is nothing but the
discrete logarithm x.
The collision theorem above tells us about the probability of at least one zi
belonging to H for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In present case, F×p with p − 1 elements is the
urn, so N = p − 1. The elements of H are red balls, so n = d. Since we are
randomly selecting m elements y1, .., ym from F×p , it implies that z1, z2, .., zm also
are random elements of F×p . Therefore, probability that at least one of zi would
belong to H is at least 1− e
(
−dm
p−1
)
, by the collision theorem. In other words, with
probability at least 1−e− dmp−1 , one can compute zi for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m if one has
access to m threads. Since the number of steps performed on each thread before zi
is computed for some i is at max 2
√
d, we conclude that it takes O(
√
d) steps to
compute x with the probability at least 1− e
(
−dm
p−1
)
if m threads are available. This
completes the proof.
Remark 2. It follows from Theorem 2 that if there exist divisors d of p − 1 of
suitable sizes, then DLP can be solved in time much less than the square root of the
group size but with a probability which increases with the number of threads used.
A practical importance of Theorem 2 lies in the fact that such divisors of p − 1
do exist for all NIST curves [6] as well as most of SEC2 curves [7]. This gives
us precise estimates about the number of group operations and threads needed to
solve DLP with a given probability. We illustrate this by an example in the next
section.
Remark 3. Note that the probability of solving the DLP in above theorem is pro-
portional to the product m · d. It follows that if we fix a probability, this product is
constant. Therefore, for a fixed probability of solving the DLP, there is a trade-off
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between the number of steps and number of threads needed in Theorem 2. Increas-
ing one of the two would decrease the other and vice-a-versa.
3 Security analysis of NIST curve P-256
As discussed earlier, our probabilistic algorithm is applicable to NIST curves. In
this section, we will demonstrate the implication of our algorithm on NIST curves.
We will do that only on the NIST curve P-256 but similar conclusions hold for
other four NIST curves over prime field as well, see appendix.
The NIST curve P-256 is defined over the prime field Fq and the order of P-256 is
a prime p given below.
q = 1157920892103562487626974469494075735300861434152903141955
33631308867097853951
p = 115792089210356248762697446949407573529996955224135760342422
259061068512044369
p− 1 = 24 · 3 · 71 · 131 · 373 · 3407 · 17449 · 38189 · 187019741 · 622491383·
1002328039319 · 2624747550333869278416773953
Since p − 1 factors into many relatively small integers, we have the following
divisors of p− 1 of various sizes.
d1 = 534427449503294145963994143640970973102047412378826412971
9829 ≈ 2201.73.
d2 = 106885489900658829192798828728194194620409482475765282594
39658 ≈ 2202.73.
d3 = 160328234850988243789198243092291291930614223713647923891
59487 ≈ 2203.32.
d4 = 18207943204577231552993280473847881053586755339746615
889955457403 ≈ 2213.47.
d5 = 238524055979961733344211974207407241801986494950680668158
4164919793 ≈ 2220.50
For above sizes of subgroups and various number of threads m, the following
tables give the probability to solve DLP. The second column of the Table 1 shows
the probabilities when the subgroup size is d1 ≈ 2201.73 bits. For example, if we
have m = 254 parallel threads, then our algorithm would solve DLP in 2101.86 steps
with probability 0.56458 which is the intersection of the fifth row(corresponding
to m = 254) and the second column(corresponding to d1 ≈ 2201.73). Other en-
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Table 1
log2 d1 = 201.73 log2 d2 = 202.73 log2 d3 = 203.32
log2(
√
d1) = 101.86 log2(
√
d2) = 101.36 log2(
√
d3) = 101.66
log2m = 45 0.00162 0.00324 0.00486
log2m = 50 0.05064 0.098711 0.14435
log2m = 52 0.18768 0.34013 0.46398
log2m = 53 0.34013 0.56458 0.71268
log2m = 54 0.56458 0.81040 0.91745
log2m = 55 0.81040 0.96405 0.993184
log2m = 56 0.96405 0.99871 0.99995
log2d4 = 213.47
log2(
√
d4) = 106.78
log2m = 41 0.29234
log2m = 42 0.49921
log2m = 43 0.74921
log2m = 44 0.93710
Table 2
log2d5 = 220.50
log2(
√
d5) = 110.25
log2m = 33 0.16218
log2m = 34 0.29805
log2m = 35 0.50727
log2m = 36 0.75721
log2m = 37 0.94106
Table 3
tries(probabilities) of the tables can be understood similarly.
If we go across a row in the tables, we see the probabilities getting increased
with the size of subgroup d. If we move along a column, probabilities increase with
the number (m) of parallel threads. Table 1 also exhibits the trade-off between d
and m for equal probability. For equal probability, highlighted diagonally in the
second and third column, we see that increasing the subgroup size by 1-bit(d1 and
d2 differ by 1-bit) results in a decrease of 1-bit in the number of parallel threads
m. As an example, to achieve the probability 0.56458, the subgroup of order d1
requires 254 parallel threads while the subgroup of order d2 requires 253.
From Table 3, we can see that DLP on the curve P-256 can be solved in
2110.25(with a significant reduction from 2128) steps with probability greater than
0.5, while using 235 parallel threads. This indicates a weakness of NIST curve
P-256 if one assumes that 235 parallel threads are within the reach of modern
distributed computing. Similar conclusions can be drawn for other NIST curves
P-192, P-224, P-384 and P-521 see appendix.
Moreover, one observes that for most of the curves in SEC2(Version 2) [7]
which also include all other ten NIST curves [6]over binary field, p − 1 factors
into small divisors. Therefore, our algorithm for solving DLP on those curves in
SEC2 [7] can similarly be studied.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a novel idea of using the implicit representation with F×p
as auxiliary group to solve the discrete logarithm problem in a group G of prime
order p. We modified the most common generic algorithm, the baby-step giant-
step algorithm for this purpose and studied it further for NIST curves over prime
fields. This algorithm that we developed brings to the spotlight the structure of the
auxiliary group for the security of the discrete logarithm problem in G. This aspect
is probably reported for the first time.
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Appendices
A NIST Curves Over Prime Field
For each of these five NIST curves of order prime p, two subgroups of F×p with
(large enough)orders d1, d2 are given such that d1 ·d2 = p−1 and gcd(d1, d2) = 1,
see Remark 1.
A.1 P-192
p = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081
p− 1 = 24 · 5 · 2389 · 9564682313913860059195669 · 3433859179316188
682119986911
d1 = 656279166350909980926771898430320 ≈ 2109.02
d2 = 9564682313913860059195669 ≈ 282.98
A.2 P-224
p = 269599466671506397946670150870196259404578077144243917216827
22368061
p− 1 = 22 · 36 · 5 · 2153 · 5052060625887581870
7470860153287666700917696099933389351507
d1 = 50520606258875818707470860153287666700917696099933389351507 ≈
2195.01
d2 = 533642580 ≈ 228.99
A.3 P-256
p = 115792089210356248762697446949407573529996955224135760342422
259061068512044369
p− 1 = 24 · 3 · 71 · 131 · 373 · 3407 · 17449 · 38189 · 187019741 · 622491383·
1002328039319 · 2624747550333869278416773953
d1 = 1489153224408067225170753316415649493584 ≈ 2130.13
d2 = 77757001302792844776776389119582520177 ≈ 2125.87
A.4 P-384
p = 3940200619639447921227904010014361380507973927046544666794
6905279627659399113263569398956308152294913554433653942643
8
p− 1 = 2 · 32 · 72 · 13 · 1124679999981664229965379347·
3055465788140352002733946906144561090641249606160407884365391979704929
268480326390471
d1 = 1167799024227242535444914507528451248843085599474507893404452814
6432239664131807464380162 ≈ 2292.55
d2 = 1124679999981664229965379347 ≈ 289.86
A.5 P-521
p = 6864797660130609714981900799081393217269435300143305409394463
45918554318339765539424505774633321719753296399637136332111386476
8612440380340372808892707005449
p− 1 = 23 · 7 · 11 · 1283 · 1458105463 · 1647781915921980690468599·
3615194794881930010216942559103847593050265703173292383701371712350878926821
661243755933835426896058418509759880171943
d1 = 4166083869350854498586791068944823620942931357552596820305098954973
694271292315253349654329419600683157636543108630210814256821981752 ≈
2440.55
d2 = 1647781915921980690468599 ≈ 280.45
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